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ABSTRACT 
The United States Army Reserve (USAR) currently has two enlistment program 
options—the Delayed Training Program (DTP) and the Delayed Entry Program (DEP). 
Enlistments under the DTP are counted as immediate gains and increase the count of the 
USAR end strength, while enlistments into the DEP do not increase the end strength until 
the Soldier ships to Basic Combat Training (BCT).  Historically, these two programs 
have not been offered concurrently. Due to recent fluctuations in the USAR end strength, 
a need has been identified for these programs to operate simultaneously.  This thesis 
develops a simulation model that allows the study of the mix of applicants allowed to 
enlist under the DTP or DEP.  The simulation illustrates that under current operating 
conditions applicants who are in high school or on an alternate training path, as well as 
17%–25% of the remaining population of applicants should enlist under the DEP.  This 
policy stabilizes the USAR end strength. The simulation model developed in this thesis 
can be used to test alternate policies for guiding enlistments as fluctuations in factors 
such as enlistment rate and attrition rate occur.    
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United States Army Reserve (USAR) end strength has reported drastic 
fluctuation from the End Strength Obligation (ESO) authorized by Congress over the past 
10 years.  One element to maintaining ESO is managing accessions and retention.  The 
USAR currently has two Non-Prior Service (NPS) enlistment program options—the 
Delayed Training Program (DTP) and the Delayed Entry Program (DEP).  Enlistments 
under the DTP are counted as immediate gains and increase the count of the USAR end 
strength, while enlistments into the DEP do not increase the end strength.  Historically, 
these two programs have not been offered concurrently.  Due to the most recent 
fluctuations in the USAR end strength, a need has been identified for these programs to 
operate simultaneously.   
This thesis develops a simulation model used to study different enlistment 
policies.  Although there are two portions to the model, Prior Service (PS) and NPS, the 
only portion manipulated during this study was the NPS portion.  This portion simulates 
applicants from the time they arrive at the MEPS to the time they ship to Basic Combat 
Training (BCT).   
Historical data was evaluated to determine attrition rates, length of time in service 
before attrition, and length of time in service prior to shipment to BCT.  The simulation 
model takes these and other factors such as the percentage of applicants allowed to join 
the DEP into account.  Twenty-one factors are manipulated during experiments on the 
simulation.  These experiments are used to relate the 21 factors to end strength.     
Results of the simulation illustrate that under current operating conditions 
applicants who are in high school or on an alternate training path and 17%–25% of the 
remaining population of applicants should enlist under the DEP in order to maintain end 
strength below 209,100.  The simulation model developed in this thesis can be used to 
test alternate policies for guiding enlistments as fluctuations in factors such as enlistment 
rate and attrition rate occur.   
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Title 10, United States Code (“Personnel Strengths:  Requirement for Annual 
Authoriziation|LII/Legal Information Institute”), provides the authority for personnel 
strengths for each of the services.  The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
(National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010) prescribes the number of 
personnel authorized.  This number may change from year to year based upon budget and 
troop requirements.  The End Strength Obligation (ESO) is required to be met on 30 
September of each year.  The ESO for the United States Army Reserve (USAR) during 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 is 205,000 Soldiers.  The NDAA authorizes the Secretary of the 
Army to allow for a 2% increase from the ESO, which brings the maximum end strength 
authorization to 209,100 Soldiers.   
A key element in reaching and maintaining ESO authorizations for any service is 
managing accessions and retention.  Historically, when Non-Prior Service (NPS) 
applicants enlist in the USAR, they were immediately counted against end strength and 
enlisteded under the Delayed Training Program (DTP).  The USAR adopted the Active 
Component enlistment program called the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) in 2004, which 
prevents a new enlistee from immediately counting against the end strength.  This change 
was made in order to temporarily decrease the USAR End Strength.   
The DEP was developed to manage end strength.  While the DEP has historically 
served as a regulation for ESO, there are no set rules or guidelines about when an enlisted 
application should fall under this program.  This thesis is aimed at studying accession and 
retention related factors in order to help develop guidelines for accessing enlistments into 
the DTP rather than the DEP.  A brief overview of the two programs and the history of 
their use follow. 
1. Delayed Training Program Overview 
The DTP is a method of accounting for Soldiers awaiting shipment to Basic 
Combat Training (BCT).  The USAR uses this program in order to allow new enlistees to 
 2
be integrated into their units prior to BCT.  The difference between the USAR and the 
Regular Army is that when applicants enlist into the USAR, they know exactly which 
unit they are assigned, in contrast to the regular Army enlistees who do not have this 
information until later in their training path. 
Enlistments into the DTP are immediate gains to the USAR, and are assigned to a 
unit against a vacancy.  Although these Soldiers boost the end strength of the USAR, they 
are not qualified for the position until they complete their training within the subsequent 
48 months.  This is viewed as a drawback.  To monitor this, the USAR maintains the unit 
Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualified (DMOSQ) measure to reflect the 
readiness level for each unit’s assigned personnel; the new Soldier that is in the DTP is 
counted as non-DMOSQ.   Soldiers are considered non-DMOSQ until they complete 
Advanced Individual Training (AIT).  Non-DMOSQ Soldiers are viewed as decreasing 
the readiness rating of the unit.   
Soldiers who are on a standard training path attend BCT for approximately nine 
weeks and then ship directly to AIT.  AIT schools last anywhere from 2–12 months, 
depending on the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in which the Soldiers have 
enlisted.  For example, AIT for a 42A, Human Resources Specialist, is just over eight 
weeks while AIT for a 68A, Biomedical Equipment Specialist, is 41 weeks long.  
Soldiers who do not ship directly from BCT to AIT are placed on an alternate training 
path and are considered “split option trainers.”  These Soldiers are normally attending 
high school or college and are only able to attend BCT and AIT during the summer 
months when they are on break from their degree programs. 
New enlistees in the DTP may attend and get paid for up to 36 Unit Training 
Assemblies per year, for up to two years, in the DTP while awaiting BCT. A Unit 
Training Assembly is a four-hour block during which the Soldier is present for duty; this 
is also referred to as drill.  A normal duty weekend for a Reserve Soldier consists of four 
4-hour blocks of duty.  When a Soldier is present for duty, he or she is also earning 
retirement points for their service.   
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The cost to the USAR for DTP Soldiers attending drills and earning retirement 
points while simultaneously decreasing readiness can be viewed negatively.  Some of 
these Soldiers are subsequently discharged after receiving these benefits even though 
they were never qualified for their position.  The DEP does not incur these costs, but 
reduces the end strength.  The DEP is discussed next. 
2. Delayed Entry Program Overview 
Enlistments into the DEP are different because they are not counted against 
USAR end strength, and are not allowed to attend or get paid for drill.  Since they are not 
assigned against a unit vacancy, they do not degrade the unit readiness by being non-
DMOSQ.  They do not become a member of the USAR or count against the end strength 
until shipment to BCT.   
When applicants enlist into the DEP, they are immediately assigned to the 
Individual Ready Reserve and a BCT training seat is reserved for them.  The Individual 
Ready Reserve is a manpower tool used to account for Soldiers who have completed their 
contractual obligation, but not their military service obligation.  There is also a special 
provision in the Individual Ready Reserve that accounts for enlistees who are awaiting 
BCT (Rotsker).  The time between when applicants enlist and the time they ship to BCT 
is anywhere from 1–365 days.  While an applicant is in the DEP, he or she has no 
military obligation other than to stay out of trouble, stay fit, remain within the weight 
restrictions, and return to the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) when directed 
for shipping to BCT. 
3. History of Delayed Training Program and Delayed Entry Program 
Until FY 2004, all applicants enlisting into the USAR entered in the DTP.  At the 
end of FY 2003, the USAR end strength exceeded 211,000, which is approximately 2,000 
above the maximum authorized end strength.  Because of this excess of personnel, the 
Chief, Army Reserve implemented the DEP in 2004 in order to reduce end strength 
numbers and comply with the authorized range.  Thus, FY 2004 was a year of transition 
as enlistments were switched from the DTP to the DEP.  The transition from DTP to DEP 
occurred based on which recruiting brigade an applicant enlisted through.  The recruiting 
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brigades were to begin enlisting applicants into the DEP in three phases:  Phase I, 2d 
Recruiting Brigade; Phase II, 5th and 6th Recruiting Brigades; and Phase III, 1st and 3d 
Recruiting Brigades.  Beginning with Phase I, enlistments into vacancies in the 
designated recruiting brigades’ area of operation were into the DEP while the other 
brigades’ remained DTP enlistments.  With each phase, the additional brigades began 
enlisting into the DEP until all three phases were complete.  In addition to bringing the 
end strength to an authorized level, this transition also prevented a decrease in readiness 
in the USAR since the new enlistees were not counted as DMOSQ numbers.  Figure 1 
shows the years the DTP and DEP policies were in use. 
Years of DTP and DDP Usage 
  
                               
                               
                               
                            
                            D
TP
 
                            
                            
                            D
EP
 
                            
                               
                               
                               
                               
   2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010   
Fiscal Years 
Figure 1.   Fiscal Years the DTP and DEP Were in Effect 
After 2004, the USAR experienced a drastic decrease in end strength numbers.  
While some decline was expected since the non-DMOSQ Soldiers in the DTP were 
eliminated, there was also decline due to difficulty finding volunteers to enlist.  The 
change in the recruiting market adversely impacted recruiting for not only the Army 
Reserve, but also the Active Component and the Army National Guard.   
 5
In FYs 2005 and 2006, the USAR had extreme shortages of personnel and fell 
short of the authorized end strength by about 15,000 Soldiers.  This sharp decrease is 
depicted in Figure 2, which illustrates a time series plot of USAR end strength from 2003 
to 2009.  Because of this shortage, the Chief, Army Reserve decided to return to the DTP 
in May 2007 in an effort to increase the end strength of the USAR.  This was one of 
several initiatives implemented to boost USAR end strength.  The end of year strength 
trend line shows the drastic drop in end strength in 2004–2005 when the USAR 
transitioned to the DEP.  It showed a significant increase between 2007 and 2009, when 
the USAR returned to the DTP. 
Other initiatives to boost end strength included the implementation of the Critical 
Skills Retention Bonus—Army Reserve (Boggess), which targeted retention of captains 
assigned to specific branches, such as Chaplains; implementation of the Army Reserve—
Recruiter Assistance Program, an initiative that motivates all Soldiers to recruit by paying 
them $2,000 for each applicant they enlist (with the condition that the applicant must 
complete AIT); and increasing enlistment bonus for all NPS applicants to the maximum 
authorized by law.  
 
Figure 2.   Authorized Strength Levels by Year 
When the USAR changed from the DEP to the DTP in 2007, the end strength 
increased quickly.  Two years after reinstating the DTP, the end strength numbers were 
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not only met, but reached the 2% over ESO and the USAR had to stop enlisting Soldiers 
into non-critical MOS in June 2009.  As a result of ceasing enlistments for the last three 
months of FY09, the USAR only enlisted 370 applicants (into critical MOS), as can be 
seen in Figure 3.  The normal average for a three-month period is just over 4,000 
enlistments, or approximately 1,400 per month.   
 
Figure 3.   Time Series Plot of Number of Non Prior Service (NPS) Enlistments  
per Month 
The stopping of enlistments is detrimental not only to recruiting momentum, but 
also to the quality of the enlistees.  Because the USAR is still under the policy that states 
that enlistments fall under the DTP (Stultz), it is cautious about the number of applicants 
allowed to enlist to ensure that the maximum authorized end strength is not exceeded.  
Although end strength numbers were at the maximum authorized level from July through 
September 2009, unit readiness suffered because many of these applicants were in units, 
but were non-DMOSQ.   
Regardless of which program applicants enlist under, they are assigned an MOS 
and a training seat for BCT is reserved for them.  If they are on a standard training path, 
meaning they ship directly from BCT to AIT, they are also scheduled for an AIT seat.  
Members of the DTP or DEP who do not ship to BCT are considered a loss.  Enlistees 
 7
fail to ship to BCT for various reasons, including fraudulent enlistment, pregnancy, 
testing positive for illegal drug use, and failure to meet the weight standard.  These losses 
are costly in both time and money.   
When a Soldier becomes a loss from the DTP, the unit is responsible for the loss 
and that enlistment may not be regained, meaning the unit is required to recruit a new 
enlistee to replace the one that is lost.  Recruitment for the USAR is conducted both by 
recruiters and Soldiers within units.  These Soldiers interact with the public regularly and 
are able to entice fully qualified applicants to fill vacancies within their units.  When an 
applicant becomes a DEP loss, recruiters are responsible for enlisting another qualified 
applicant, which makes their job increasingly difficult.  Depending on when the enlistee 
becomes a loss, the training seat they were holding may go unfilled.  Training seats are 
costly and must be paid for by the USAR whether or not a Soldier fills that training seat.   
Because enlistments have gone into DTP during some time periods and into DEP 
in others, USAR end strength has not been consistent.  This thesis studies utilizing a 
combination of both policies rather than the historical either/or policies that have failed to 
regulate end strength.   
This thesis develops a simulation model of the accessions and retention in the 
USAR in order to study the effect of DTP versus DEP enlistment and its impact on end 
strength.  The results help guide the USAR in determining which program applicants 
should enlist under, with the goal of maintaining consistent end strength at the authorized 
number of Soldiers.  
B. OBJECTIVE OF THESIS 
The objective of this thesis work is to create a simulation model that is easily 
adjusted to run various scenarios to evaluate policy decisions that specify when 
applicants should enlist into the DTP or DEP.  This thesis describes the development of a 
simulation of the enlistment process as well as an analysis of factors that influence end 
strength.  This research also attempts to identify a mix of applicants entering the USAR 
under the DTP versus DEP that allow regulation of end strength. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
One of the main concerns of the Army is manpower, or more specifically, 
strength management, which is putting the right Soldier in the right unit in order to 
accomplish the mission.  There have been several studies conducted on manpower and 
manpower modeling, most of which utilized optimization models.  These models deal 
primarily with active component manpower and how individuals progress through their 
military career.   
Edwards (1031-1040) discusses the need for models in manpower planning and 
reviews several different types of Department of Defense models.  These models 
included deterministic and stochastic models.  He determined that models that use 
aggregate numbers are more widely used than those that consider individuals 
specifically.  Throughout his survey process, he determined that simulation models 
appear to be used less often due to data requirements.   
Much as Edwards does, Schank et al. (17–24), discuss that strength management 
models have a varying range of complexity.  The less complex models utilize the basic 
formula for determining future strength:  Future Strength = Current Strength + Gains – 
Losses.  More complex models include one or two additional variables, for example, 
years of service or term of enlistment.  The most complex models include even more 
variables, such as rank structure and MOS breakdown.  The Army uses two models, the 
Enlisted Loss Inventory Model (ELIM) and the Military Occupational Specialty Level 
System (MOSLS), in order to minimize the deviations from the operating strength, which 
is the difference between the number of authorizations and the people available to fill 
those authorizations.   Both of these models optimize and simulate.  They “integrate 
accession, retention, training, promotion, and reclassification policies and organizations 
by providing an integrated framework for addressing near-term programming 
adjustments and long-term policy guidance” (Schank et al. 23).   
MOSLS is described in more detail and reviewed in an article published by Eiger 
et al. (57-73).  MOSLS creates a seven-year projection of the Army’s enlisted strength by 
rank and MOS.  MOSLS seeks to place Soldiers into positions for which they are fully 
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qualified.  Soldiers assigned to positions they are not trained for are considered 
misaligned.  MOSLS also conducts a cost-benefit analysis based on misaligned Soldiers.  
In addition to the optimization and simulation models within MOSLS, there is also a 
network model that works with a Markovian process modeling MOS transfers, 
promotions, gains, and losses.  The projection system of MOSLS is a “multi-period 
network model of personnel flow within the enlisted ranks” (Eiger 64).  Arcs in the 
network represent personnel flows.  “Some of these arcs have negative costs (incentives) 
to represent flow below the target, and some positive.  Thus we say that MOSLS’ 
optimization is based on separable linear goal programming” (Eiger 64).  The simulation 
portion of the model interprets the solution provided by the optimization to more 
accurately portray losses and promotions.  In their review of MOSLS, Eiger et al. (57–
73), determined that in using MOSLS, the Army saved over $65 million in annual 
benefits in 1986 by correctly aligning the non-commissioned officer positions.   
The United States Army Manpower Analysis Agency published a document in 
June 2008 outlining the manpower modeling methods used by the U.S. Army to 
determine manpower requirements.  The document describes the five steps used in 
creating a manpower model.  These steps include selecting the function (formulate the 
problem), analyze business processes (evaluate how operations are currently conducted), 
select potential approaches, formulate models and simulations (create the model), and 
validate models and simulations.  It goes on to state that once these five steps have been 
completed, the model should be “verified, validated, and approved for use.  If the analysis 
team utilized foresight enough to make a flexible tool, then the tool can be used beyond 
the traditional manpower requirements determination.  It can be used at many levels for 
sensitivity analyses, organizational efficiency assessments, and process improvement 
studies.  Again, the model and its commensurate simulations are tools that can have more 
than one use” (U.S. Army 8).  When the process outlined in this document is complete, 
the Army “will have a powerful analytical tool at its disposal to enable leadership at 
several levels to make informed decisions” (U.S. Army 9). 
Gass et al. (5–17) discuss the Army Manpower Long Range Planning System 
(MLRPS).  MLRPS uses a stochastic model to project the strength of the Army over a 
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20-year period, breaking it down into skill, years of service, and rank level detail.  It 
allows for projections of strength, gains, losses, and movement from one MOS to 
another.  It also uses a linear goal programming formulation in order to determine 
transition rates.   MLRPS, like other models discussed in this section, looks to put the 
correct person in the correct position.  
The Joint Specialty Officer Modeling System (JSOMS), as discussed by 
Hentzchel, is “a management tool capable of analyzing the immediate and long-term 
impact of joint policy implementation” (vii).  JSOMS simulates the assignment process 
for naval officers.  Much like MLRPS, this model also accounts for gains, losses, 
promotions and rotations.  However, JSOMS operates on a quarterly clock instead of the 
annual clock of the MLRPS.  The development of the JSOMS included three types of 
approaches:  (1) array transition modeling, (2) network simulation, and (3) discrete entity 
simulation.  Because discrete entity simulation was the only approach that proved 
effective, it was ultimately used to build the JSOMS.  It considers each officer 
individually as they move through their military career.   
Common methods used in manpower modeling include optimization and 
simulation.  Optimization models use aggregate numbers as opposed to specific 
individuals, which may be why they are used more frequently.  They have fewer data 
requirements than simulation models and are good for determining the deviation from 
operating strength.  Simulations follow individuals throughout the system, which gives a 
better portrayal of behavior.  Simulations are good for viewing policy changes, but are 
not highly used due to the data requirements.   
D.   THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides a description of the discrete event simulation model that is 
built for the research presented in this thesis.  Chapter III discusses the experimental 
design that is used to study the simulation model.  Chapter IV provides an analysis of the 
model, which is done through design of experiments and statistical data analysis of the 
results from the experiments conducted using the simulation model.  Chapter V provides 
conclusions and recommendations. 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the development of the simulation model including the 
historical data used to create inputs to the model.  It also discusses how the data is used to 
validate the simulation model, the scope and limitations of the model, and assumptions 
used in the model. 
A.  BUILDING OF A DEP/DTP POLICY SIMULATION MODEL 
An Arena simulation model (Arena®) is created in order to review different 
enlistment policies for this thesis.  It acts as a decision analysis tool that can be used to 
suggest what percentage of applicants should be allowed to enter the USAR in the DTP, 
rather than the DEP, to maintain ESO.  There are two main portions of the Arena model, 
the Prior Service (PS) portion and the NPS portion.  The high level model is shown in 
Figure 4.   
 
Figure 4.   High Level Overview of Simulation Model 
The PS portion, Figure 5, depicts the portion of the model that contains Soldiers 
enlisting or transferring to the USAR who have had more than 180 days of military 
service (Army Regulation 601-210 17).  These Soldiers may come directly from the 
Active Component, the Individual Ready Reserve, or have completed their initial term of 
service and then have decided to enlist in the USAR after a break in service.   
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Figure 5.   PS Portion of Arena Model 
This section of the model simulates a PS Soldier from the time he or she enters 
the USAR to the time he or she leaves the USAR, and is counted against the end strength 
of the USAR from the date of the enlistment contract to the date of the expiration term of 
service.  The model conducts a check of end strength upon the arrival of a potential PS 
enlistment to ensure the USAR is not above the authorized strength.  If the end strength is 
not at the maximum authorized level, the Soldier is allowed to enlist.  Soldiers remain in 
the system for a designated amount of time based on historical data.  Once they reach that 
designated length of time, they become a loss to the USAR. 
The NPS portion of the model, which is the focus of this thesis, simulates 
applicants enlisting for the first time into the USAR.  The initial portion of the model is in 
Figure 6.  Not all fully qualified applicants who arrive at the MEPS enlist.  This is 
accounted for early on and those applicants leave the model with no further processing.  
Much as with the PS portion of the model, when an applicant decides to enlist, a check of 
the end strength is conducted and if the USAR is at the maximum capacity, that applicant 
is denied enlistment.  This mirrors what occurred in June 2009 when enlistments stopped.   
 
Figure 6.   Initial NPS Portion of Arena Model 
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Applicants who are allowed to enlist then proceed through the remainder of the 
model, following a path depending on what category they are assigned.  NPS applicants 
are separated into three categories: (1) Currently in High School (CIHS); (2) Alternate 
Trainer (ALT); or (3) Applicants who do not fall into previous two categories (OTHER).  
The CIHS applicants are juniors in high school who do not ship to BCT until the end of 
their junior year.  ALT applicants enlist under the DTP or DEP for up to a year prior to 
shipment to BCT.  The USAR has a maximum number of CIHS and ALT enlistments 
authorized each year as determined by the annual mission letter (Farrisee), which is a 
document that prescribes the accession mission or goal for that fiscal year.  The largest of 
the three categories is the OTHER category, which simulates enlisting under DTP or DEP 
based on proportions set by the user.  This category has the most potential to impact end 
strength. 
The NPS portion of the model simulates the arrival of a fully qualified applicant 
at the MEPS through the time he or she ships to BCT.  It models the fraction of fully 
qualified applicants who actually contract, those who enter the DTP and DEP, the percent 
that fail to ship to BCT, and the time they are in the USAR if they do fail to ship to BCT.  
In addition, it also simulates the amount of time they are in the DTP or DEP before they 
ship to BCT. 
Neither portion, PS nor NPS, of the model allows enlistment if the USAR end 
strength is above the maximum authorized by Congress.  When end strength exceeds 
authorizations, the USAR will deny all applicants, including those fully qualified, from 





Figure 7.   Main NPS Portion of Arena Model 
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The nodes are labeled and a description follows.  The shaded nodes represent blocks of 
the simulation that perform the same task.   
• Nodes 1 and 2:  Assignments to CIHS, ALT, or OTHER, based on 
proportions of the total population. 
• Node 3:  Percent of OTHER who join enlist under the DEP. 
• Node 4:  Enlistments under the DEP who fail to ship to BCT. 
• Node 5:  Time the enlistee is in the DTP or DEP prior to failing to ship to 
BCT. 
• Node 6:  Percent of enlistees who ship to BCT directly from DEP. 
• Node 7:  Time the enlistee is in the DTP or DEP prior to shipment to BCT. 
• Node 8:  Time Soldier is in the USAR before they exit the service. 
• Nodes 9–11:  Accounts for enlistments under the DEP that transfer to DTP 
for a specified amount of time prior to BCT. 
B. DATA COLLECTION RESOURCE 
The data used in this thesis was collected from two agencies, the United States 






Table 1.   Data Provider 
The data was processed and used in the simulation.  The data analysis consisted of 
determining proper distributions to fit the data.  The distributions are used in simulation 
as representations of reality.  For example, consider the distribution of ALT applicants 
who attrit before BCT.  The author filtered this data from all those who attrit before BCT. 
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This data is then analyzed using the Arena Input Analyzer (Arena®).  The Arena Input 
Analyzer pulls data from a text file and determines the maximum likelihood estimators 
for various distributions.  It then calculates the mean squared error and rank orders those 
distributions from smallest to largest mean squared error.  The author then conducted 
Chi-Squared goodness of fit tests on the three best ranked distributions.  This step tests 
the null hypotheses that the data came from each of these distributions.  There were 14 
data sets tested in which the corresponding p-values failed the goodness of fit tests.  
Empirical distribution functions were then used to model the inputs, a process which is 
plausible for large data sets.  
Figure 8 shows the empirical cumulative distribution of the number of days ALT 
applicants spend in the DEP before they attrit (prior to BCT).  The numbers on the y-axis 
show the cumulative probability (numbers above the bars on the graph) that applicants 
remain in the DEP a certain number of days (x-axis) before they attrit (prior to BCT).  
For example, 5.8% of enlistees spend 31 days or less in the DEP before they attrit (prior 
to BCT).  
 
Figure 8.   Input Analyzer (Arena®) Empirical Cumulative Distribution of ALT Days in 
DEP before Attrition 
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Data provided from United States Army Recruiting Command includes loss data 
on enlistments that occurred between FY2005 and FY2009.  This data provided the date 
the applicant contracted (enlisted) into the USAR, the date the applicant was scheduled to 
ship to BCT, and the date the applicant became a loss to the USAR.  The data also 
provided various attributes of the applicants such as their education level and training 
path.  This data enabled the author to conduct analysis on two years of data for both the 
DTP (FY 2008-FY 2009) and DEP (FY 2005-FY 2006).  Because FY 2004 and FY 2007 
were transition years, they were not used for the analysis of attrition from DTP or DEP, 
or length in each program prior to shipping to BCT or failing to ship. 
Accession data from FY 2000-FY 2009 was provided by Army Reserve G1.  This 
data includes daily gains (accessions) of all PS, NPS, Officer, Warrant Officer, and 
Enlisted categories.  Because FY 2009 was not a normal year for enlistments and 
enlistments were almost completely shut down for the last three months of the fiscal year, 
it was not used when determining accession rates into the USAR.  Army Reserve G1 also 
provided monthly loss data and length of service for these same categories.  Figure 9 
depicts the gains and losses for the USAR from FY 2000 to FY 2009.  As can be seen in 
this figure, one cause leading to the USAR reaching the maximum authorized end 
strength is that in FY 2008 and FY 2009 the gains outnumbered the losses. 
 
Figure 9.   USAR Gains Versus Losses 
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C. MODEL VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
The simulation model is verified with debugging and the use of animation.  The 
simulation model is created in steps and debugged after each step prior to creating the 
next portion of the model.  Each applicant was animated and watched as it progressed 
through the model to ensure it traveled through the model in the correct manner.   
 
Figure 10.   End Strength by Year 
Model validation is the process of comparing the simulation behavior to the real 
system and its behavior (Banks et al. 374).  Data collected from the simulation is 
validated against historical information.  Steady-state conditions, after the removal of 
initial condition bias, are used to validate the simulation.  Steady state occurs when the 
metric of interest becomes stationary about a mean.  Historical data is used to validate 
steady-state results against past USAR end strength.  End strength numbers were 
compared when enlisting solely under the DEP and then again when solely under the 
DTP. 
Historical end strength data is drawn from FY 2001-FY 2009.  During FY 2001-
FY 2003 and FY 2008-FY 2009 the USAR enlisted applicants under the DTP.  From FY 
2005 to FY 2006 the USAR enlisted applicants into the DEP.  FY 2004 and FY 2007 
were years of transition. These dates are taken into account when verifying the model 
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under each of the programs.  A review of historical data shows that during the years the 
USAR was using only the DEP, the end strength of the USAR was below the ESO.  It 
was far below the minimum authorized strength authorized by Congress.   
Review of this data also shows that during the years the USAR enlisted applicants 
into the DTP, the USAR end strength rose to and exceeded the maximum authorized by 
Congress. This can be seen easily in Figure 10.  The transition years show the drastic 
decrease and increase and associated programs used by year.  When changing from DTP 
to DEP, there is a decrease in end strength, and when changing from DEP to DTP, there 
is an increase.   
As seen in Figure 11, when the model is run with all applicants joining the DEP, 
the end strength reached a steady state with a mean around 192,000 Soldiers.  The 
average end strength numbers for FY 2005 and FY 2006 was approximately 191,900 
Soldiers.  Thus, when run with all applicants joining the DEP, it closely mirrored actual 
strength of the USAR when policy dictated all applicants would join the DEP. 
 
Figure 11.   Base Model Run of Simulation Depicting the Reaching of Steady State 
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To validate the model during the years when the USAR was enlisting into the 
DTP, the simulation is run with no applicants joining the DEP.  End strength during the 
years the USAR was enlisting under the DTP ranged from an end strength low of 205,297 
to an end strength high of 211,890.  As can be seen in Figure 12, the end strength reached 
a steady state around 208,000 Soldiers when the model is run with all OTHER applicants 
joining the DTP.  This is an accurate representation of historical trends.   
 
Figure 12.   Base Model Run With All Applicants Joining the DTP Depicting the 
Reaching of Steady State at 209,000 Soldiers 
D SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This simulation is not intended to account for every detailed aspect of the 
enlistment process.  The scope of this thesis focuses on NPS enlistments into the USAR.  
It models applicants from the time they enlist to the time they ship to BCT (or become a 
loss to the USAR).   
There are several limitations to the simulation model developed for the thesis 
research.  This model only accounts for changes in the NPS applicants; it does not take 
into account changes in the PS enlistments.  A PS applicant is one who has performed 
180 days or more of military service or has graduated from AIT (Chapter II, Section A).   
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There are 21 variables that are manipulated in this simulation model that are discussed in 
Chapter III.  In addition to the model limitations, there are several assumptions worth 
noting: 
• ESO is represented by average end strength, rather than a single value 
from 30 September each year. 
• Arrivals are consistent throughout the year with no seasonal trends (data 
driven). 
• All MOS are considered equally for enlistment into the DTP or DEP. 
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III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The goal of this thesis is to study the mix of NPS enlisted applicants entering into 
the USAR in the DTP or DEP.  The simulation developed for this study (discussed in 
Chapter II) is used to study end strength over time for the various policy decisions.  End 
strength is affected by various factors in addition to DTP versus DEP.  These factors are 
included in the simulation and can be manipulated based on current state of affairs or 
anticipated fluctuation.   
Experimental design is used to systematically alter the factors in the simulation 
model in order to study their impact on the metric of interest (end strength).  This chapter 
details the setup of the experiment, including the inputs of interest and the response 
variable.  The choice of experimental design is also be explained.  
A. FACTORS AND RESPONSE VARIABLE 
1. Factors 
The simulation model described in Chapter II has a large number of factors that 
can be adjusted. There are 21 factors that are manipulated using experimental design. The 
list of these 21 factors of interest is shown in Table 2.  Variable names for each of the 
factors are listed on the left hand side of the table.  During the analysis the factors are 










  FACTORS    MIN  MAX 
X1  MEPS ARRIVAL (NUMBER ARRIVALS)    15000 25000 
X2  CONTRACT RATE (PERCENT)    75%  85% 
X3  ED LEVEL (PERCENT)    11%  19% 
X4  TRAIN PATH (PERCENT)    2%  5% 
X5  JOINS DEP (PERCENT)    10%  90% 
X6  DEP CIHS ATTRIT RATE (PERCENT)    14%  20% 
X7  DEP ALT ATTRIT RATE (PERCENT)    13%  26% 
X8  DEP OTHER ATTRIT RATE (PERCENT)    10%  16% 
X9  ALT DEP TO BCT (PERCENT)    10%  90% 
X10  CIHS DEP TO BCT (PERCENT)    10%  90% 
X11  OTH DEP TO BCT (PERCENT)    10%  90% 
X12  ALT DEP FAIL TO SHIP (NUMBER OF DAYS)    30  330 
X13  CIHS DEP FAIL TO SHIP (NUMBER OF DAYS)    30  330 
X14  OTH DEP FAIL TO SHIP (NUMBER OF DAYS)    30  330 
X15  ALT DEP TO BCT (NUMBER OF DAYS)    30  330 
X16  CIHS DEP TO BCT (NUMBER OF DAYS)    30  330 
X17  OTH DEP TO BCT (NUMBER OF DAYS)    30  330 
X18  DTP TO BCT (NUMBER OF DAYS)    30  330 
X19  DTP ATTRIT RATE (PERCENT)    9%  15% 
X20  DTP TO FAIL TO SHIP  (NUMBER OF DAYS)    30  330 
X21  LENGTH IN DTP IF TRANSFER (NUMBER OF DAYS)    30  180 
 
Table 2.   Factors and Ranges 
Experimental design requires the specification of values that the input variables 
can take on. The associated ranges of the values that the 21 factors of interest can take on 
are also presented in Table 2. The ranges for MEPS Arrival, Education Level, Training 
Path, and all Attrition Rates were determined based on the analysis of historical data.   
 25
The range for Contract Rate is determined by a five percent overage and underage from 
the USAR contracting goal of 80%.  The range selection for the remaining factors, 
including number of days the applicant is in the DTP or DEP, is based on minimum and 
maximum time authorized by regulation to remain in either of the programs. 
2. Response Variable  
The simulation built for this thesis can be used to collect a number of different 
output variables. Of interest to this thesis work is the end strength output. End strength is 
used as the sole response variable for the data collection and subsequent analysis.   
End strength is important because the USAR is authorized a fixed budget for 
ESO.  An overage of ESO would lead to going over budget. As a result of going over 
budget another program may suffer because funds would have to be reprogrammed in 
order to pay personnel. Going over ESO might mean, for example, that funds would have 
to be removed from equipment acquisition, which would degrade equipment readiness. 
Alternatively, an underage of ESO would result in decreased readiness. 
B THE DESIGN 
The experimental design in this thesis is used to study the relationship between 
the factors in Table 2 and end strength. After running the experiment, linear regression is 
used to quantify the relationship, if any, between these factors and the end strength. The 
linear regression model in this thesis considers main effects and two-factor interactions. 
There are 21 main effects (see Table 2) and 210 two-factor interactions (21 choose 2).    
A factorial design for studying 21 factors would require 221 experiments. This is 
both infeasible, due to time constraints, and impractical, due to the large amount of data 
that would be produced.  A small number of runs that can efficiently estimate the factors 
in a linear regression is desirable when the simulation run length is rather long (in this 
case approximately 3–5 hours per experiment).  A better option than the full factorial is 
the Plackett-Burman (P-B) design (Plackett and Burman 308). The sparsity of effects 
principle states that only a small portion of the factors are expected to be significant 
(Montgomery 247), which is why the P-B design chosen is desirable.  The P-B design is a 
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non-regular factorial design useful for screening main effects and two-factor interactions. 
A non-regular design is one with no full confounding between any two factors of interest.  
The maximum amount of correlation between any pair of main effects or two-factor 
interactions is ±0.33.  
Assuming not all 231 effects (main effects and 2-factor interactions) are 
significant, 24-run P-B is chosen.  The P-B design matrix, in units coded on [1,1] is 
shown in Table 3. In addition to the 24 experiments given by the design an additional 
center point experiment is run.  Each row in this design matrix corresponds to a single 


















RUN X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 X17 X18 X19 X20 X21 
1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1
2 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1
3 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1
4 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1
5 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1
6 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1
7 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1
8 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1
9 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1
10 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1
11 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1
12 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1
15 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1
16 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1
17 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1
18 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1
19 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1
20 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1
21 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1
22 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
23 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1
24 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1
25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 3.   Plackett-Burman Design Matrix 
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Note that Table 3 contains the design matrix (the 25 experiments) using coded 
units.  The coded units are on a scale of [–1, 1].  The experiments are simulated with 
actual units, but the analysis is conducted using the coded units in order to directly 
compare magnitude and direction of all significant main effects or two-factor interactions 
in unitless quantities.  The translation of coded to actual units can be done by relating the 
low and high levels from Table 2 to –1 and 1, respectively.  As an example, factor X1 is 
MEPS Arrival.  The low level of MEPS Arrival (–1) corresponds to 15,000 arrivals and 
the high level (+1) corresponds to 25,000 arrivals. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
Linear regression is used to analyze the data collected after running the 
experiments explained in Chapter III. The results are discussed throughout this chapter. 
The JMP software (JMP®) is used to perform all of the data analysis presented in this 
chapter.  
A. LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS 
Stepwise linear regression is used to find the main effects and two-factor 
interactions that significantly influence end strength.  The following hypotheses is tested 











= =≠  
where βι is the regression coefficient associated with all of the 21 main effects, 210 two-
factor interactions, and the intercept (thus there are 232 potentially significant 
coefficients).  Mixed stepwise regression is used with probability to enter and leave set at 
0.05. 
The results of the stepwise regression procedure are used to generate a fitted 
linear regression model, using least squares.  The resulting equation is:  
1 5 1 5 5 15 20 21
ˆ 204,726 4029 3634 4514 1916 2655Y X X X X X X X X= + − + − +  
where Ŷ= fitted end strength, X1=MEPS Arrival, X5=Joins DEP, X15=ALT DEP to BCT, 
X20=DTP to Fail to Ship, and X21=Length in DTP if Transfer.  This equation can be used 
to determine what portion of the population should join the DEP based on projected 
variable values.   
An example of how this equation is used follows:  if Ŷ is set at ESO, 205,000 and 
other variable information is set to values found in Table 4, the percent of applicants that 
should join the DEP can be found. 
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Table 4.   Factors, Actual Values, and Coded Units 
The coded units are plugged into the variables in the formula and a value is found 






Step 1:  205,000 204,726.38 4028.9395*.2 3634.08 4513.7249*.2*
1916.062* * 0.6 2654.986*.67*.2
Step 2:  87.9359 1581.7*
Step 3:  0.056










Figure 13 illustrates a good fit, for the regression model, based on the high R2 and 
R2 Adjusted, low mean squared error, and significant analysis of variance F ratio. 
 
Figure 13.   Screen Shot from JMP® of Summary of Fit and Analysis of Variance 
The top three effects, in terms of contribution, are: X1, X5, and X1*X5, are 
discussed in detail the subsections that follow. 
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1. DOX Results 
a. MEPS Arrivals (X1) 
The fitted regression coefficient for MEPS arrival (X1) is approximately 
4029.  The regression coefficient for a main effect is equal to the slope of Ŷ as a function 
of that effect.  The effect can be interpreted as saying that:  a single unit increase in 
MEPS Arrival (this translates to a 5,000 increase in actual units as opposed to single units 
in coded) increases the average yearly end strength by 4029, holding all other factors 
constant.  Note that when the simulation is run with the MEPS Arrivals set at the high 
level, the USAR achieves the maximum end strength (209,100) authorized by Congress 
and applicants are denied enlistment.  The simulation model can be used to collect data 
such as number of applicants denied enlistment when the maximum capacity is reached.  
This turns out to be a function related to the arrival rate at the MEPS. 
b. Joins DEP (X5) 
The fitted coefficient for Joins DEP (X5) is approximately minus 3634.  A 
single unit increase in Joins DEP (40% actual increase) results in a decrease in the 
average yearly end strength by 3634.   This result is expected because when a majority of 
the applicants are enlisted under the DEP, they are not immediately counted in the end 
strength. 
c. MEPS Arrival * Joins DEP 
A two-factor interaction, shown in Figure 14, indicates a change in slope 
for one factor in the presence of another.  This two-factor interaction shows that when the 
MEPS Arrival (X1) factor is set at the high level, there is little change to the end strength 
when the Joins DEP (X5) factor moves from the low level to the high level.  It also shows 
that when the MEPS Arrival (X1) factor is set at the low level, then the end strength 
decreases as the Joins DEP (X5) factor moves from the low level to the high level. 
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Figure 14.   Two-Factor Interactions 
2. MEPS Arrival regulation Results 
Due to the fact that when the MEPS Arrival (X1) is at the high level, the end 
strength immediately rose to the maximum capacity, additional analysis is conducted 
using a fixed level of MEPS Arrival to determine significant factors.  This separate 
analysis resulted in Contract Rate and Joins DEP as significant main effects.  As the 
Contract Rate increases, so does the USAR end strength; and as the percentage of 
applicants who Join DEP increases, the USAR end strength decreases.   
B. SETTING POLICY BASED ON PERCENTAGE OF APPLICANTS 
ENTERING THE DEP 
When the MEPS Arrival (X1) factor is at the high level, the end strength numbers 
increased almost immediately to the maximum capacity of 209,100 Soldiers, regardless 
of all other factors.  Analysis shows there is a definite need for a policy change that allow 
the DEP and DTP to exist simultaneously.  Ultimately, the USAR would like to maintain 
a steady state around the 205,000 end strength.   
Further analysis is conducted holding all factors at nominal levels except Joins 
DEP (X5), which is varied from 0%–100% in 10% increments.  The USAR is interested 
in maintaining strength at 205,000 and up to 209,100.  Using the results, which are 
presented in Figure 15, it can be seen that if CIHS, ALT, and 17%–25% of OTHER 
applicants enlist into the DEP, the end strength falls within the desired levels.  
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Figure 15.   Changes to DEP Percentages Only 
If the number of applicants arriving at the MEPS is low, then the percentage 
allowed into the DEP also needs to be low.  The USAR end strength would benefit more 
if applicants were allowed to enter directly into the DTP.  In all of the simulations that the 
MEPS Arrival (X1) and DEP percentage were low, the end strength is above 205,000 
Soldiers.  However, due to the variation of the other factors, 5 of the 6 simulations 
resulted in a number of applicants denied enlistments.  The number of applicants denied 
enlistment per day ranges from 0.28–4.87 applicants.  Figure 16 shows the end strength 
of Run 1 of the DOX where the MEPS Arrivals and the percentage of OTHER applicants 
who joined the DEP were both low.   
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Figure 16.   Experimental Run with MEPS Arrival Low and DEP Percentage High 
When the number of applicants arriving at the MEPS is low and the percentage of 
applicants who enter the USAR under the DEP is high, the end strength count never 
reaches 205,000 Soldiers.  Although this simulation leads to no applicants being denied 
enlistment, it also prevents the USAR from reaching the end strength goal of 205,000 
Soldiers.  This run also allowed for the highest percentage of DMOSQ Soldiers with 
roughly 2.97% being non-DMOSQ. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. USE OF ARENA MODEL TO IMPLEMENT DIFFERENT POLICIES 
A simulation model is developed using Arena Software to study the effects certain 
factors had on the USAR end strength.  This model is broken into two main sections, PS 
and NPS.  The PS portion is developed solely to mirror a PS Soldier from time of 
enlistment to the time they are a loss to the USAR.  The NPS portion of the model is the 
part that is explored in depth in this thesis.   
The simulation model can be used as an analysis tool to evaluate changes to 
factors of interest.  It is currently based on historical data, but can be changed to model 
current situations, such as accession and attrition rates.  It can also be used to evaluate 
policy changes affecting enlistments to DTP rather than DEP.   
Design and analysis of experiments is used to show factors that affect end 
strength the most are MEPS Arrivals (X1) and Joins DEP (X5).  These two main effects 
show that as the MEPS Arrival (X1) rate increases, so does the end strength of the USAR.  
When the Joins DEP (X5) factor increases, the end strength of the USAR decreases.  The 
levels of Joins DEP (X5) can be adjusted to determine percentage of applicants that 
should be allowed to join under the DEP to maintain end strength of 205,000 Soldiers, as 
shown in Chapter IV, Section C for various levels of MEPS Arrivals. 
B. FUTURE STUDIES 
Additional studies can be conducted in this same area.  These areas include 
expanding the model to account for enlisting into the DTP or DEP based on MOS or 
recruitment regions, seasonal trends in enlistment, within-year variability of end strength, 
and the cost associated with each of these programs.   
Expanding the model using the various MOS to determine whether the applicant 
entered under the DTP or DEP could help manage the end strength while helping to filter 
applicants into the required MOS.  MOS that are at a higher level of fill could be set for 
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enlistees to only join the DEP, thus stabilizing that specific MOS fill.  Conversely, MOS 
that are at a lower level of fill could have Soldiers enlist directly into the DTP in order to 
count that as an immediate gain to the USAR. 
Filtering enlistments into the DTP or DEP based on region of recruitment may 
also prove to be beneficial.  Should there be one region that has a higher level of fill than 
other regions, then enlistments in that region could be set to DEP only.  This would allow 
the fill for that region to stabilize.  The other regions with a lower level of fill could in 
turn be set to DTP only, thus counting enlistments as immediate gains and stabilizing 
those regions’ strength. 
Soldiers in the DTP are allowed to attend and get paid for their attendance at the 
monthly drills.  This incurs a cost to the USAR that could be avoided if these Soldiers 
had enlisted into the DEP.  Paying Soldiers prior to BCT is expensive because these 
Soldiers are not trained to do their job and there are restrictions on duties they are 
allowed to perform.  A detailed cost analysis should be done to assess the monetary 
impact of the two enlistment programs on the USAR. 
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